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INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, refugees have fled to more, different
states than ever before. For example, the recent Syrian conflict has
quickly transformed a state which once hosted more than fifteen
percent of asylum-seekers globally into one of the largest source
countries for refugees fleeing danger. This Essay assesses whether
this and other changes in refugee protection and migration
patterns have also changed customary international refugee law.
States such as Turkey and Lebanon, once minor refugee hosts, have
also quickly begun to care for millions. The developing conflict in
Ukraine may also create new refugee movements and new states
hosting more displaced people. These changes mean that more of
the world's asylum-seekers are protected by different legal
regimes than ten years ago. In addition, customary international
law has received renewed attention, and its methodology
continues to be adjusted and refined, including issues such as the
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role of international organizations and specially interested states.
This Essay will apply recent scholarship on customary
international law to consider if this shift in asylum-seeker
migration patterns and the resulting change in specially interested
states forces us to change our approach to customary international
law on refugee status.
To make the claim that changing migration patterns may
impact customary international law, this Essay will focus on the
doctrine of “specially interested” states and their role in
establishing customary international law. Under the traditional
notion of specially interested states, the practice and opinio juris of
certain states is more important than others in establishing
customary international law. That said, the traditional
understanding of international doctrine does not clearly
distinguish between proving the existence of customary
international law and prescribing customary international law.1
Actors like the International Law Commission, however, are
increasingly attempting to articulate the method for identifying
customary international law,2 including the role of specially
interested states.3
This Essay will first discuss the doctrine of specially
interested states. It will then identify which states were specially
interested in refugee migration ten years ago and which states are
specially interested now. After chronicling the change in specially
interested states, this Essay will speculate on some possible
changes in customary international law on refuge, focusing on the
example of the refugee definition as supplemented by other
regional instruments.

1. See, e.g., William Thomas Worster, The Inductive and Deductive Methods in
Customary International Law Analysis: Traditional and Modern Approaches, 45
GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 445 (2014) [hereinafter Worster, Inductive and Deductive Methods].
2. See, e.g., Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of the Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/73/10, at 119 (2018) [hereinafter ILC, Draft Conclusions on Customary International
Law].
3. See, e.g., William Thomas Worster, The Transformation of Quantity to Quality:
Critical Mass in the Formation of Customary International Law, 31(1) B. U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2013)
[hereinafter Worster, Transformation of Quantity to Quality].
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II. IDENTIFYING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
When determining the existence of a norm under customary
international law, one must consult evidence of state practice and
opinio juris. Both the Statute of the International Court of Justice
and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
include the same statement on customary international law as a
source of law.4 These instruments require two elements for
proving customary international law: state practice and opinio
juris sive necessitatis.5 State practice is the objective widespread
and consistent practice of states,6 and opinio juris is the subjective
belief of those states that they are acting out of a sense of
obligation.7
We do not, however, need to assess all states to establish
whether a norm of customary international law is widespread.8
Quite simply, states do not have equal influence on the formation
of customary international law. Doctrine has long recognized the
notion of the "specially interested" state.9 This idea is that states
4. See Statute of the Permanent Court of Justice art. 38, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 380;
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 16, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
5. See, e.g., S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 7);
Asylum Case (Colom./Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276–77 (Nov. 20); North Sea Continental Shelf
(Den./Ger.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20).
6. See Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. at 276–77; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-11 (5th ed. 1998).
7. See S.S. “Lotus”, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 27-28; Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. at 277; Right of
Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 42-43 (Apr. 12); North Sea
Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 43; Military & Paramilitary Acts in & Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108-09 (June 27).
8. See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ¶ 57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997)
(“[I]t is generally accepted that . . . [a] comprehensive survey of all legal systems of the
world [is not required] as this would involve a practical impossibility and has never been
the practice of the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals which
have had recourse to Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.”).
9. See Aaland Island Question, Advisory Opinion, 1920 League of Nations Official J.
Spec. Supp. No. 3 (1920); S.S. “Wimbledon” (Fr., It., Japan & U.K. v. Ger.) 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 1, at 7 (Jan. 16); Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138 (Dec. 18); Right of
Passage over Indian Territory, 1960 I.C.J. at 23; North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at
43; JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. RED. CROSS, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW xlv (2005) [hereinafter ICRC, CUSTOMARY IHL].
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that are more significantly impacted or participate more actively
in certain practices have a larger contribution to developing
customary international law doctrine that is proportionate to their
enhanced role.10 At first, this method might appear to contradict
the accepted rule of sovereign equality; however, it is merely a
means for identifying rules of custom reliably and efficiently. This
is not to say that “uninterested” states are not invested in the
existence of a customary international law rule.11 It means instead
that, in sampling state practice, one must include those states that
not only engage in the practice, but that engage in the most
representative practice of the international community.12 Two
prominent examples of specially interested states having
significant impact on customary international law are roles that
coastal states had in forming the law of the sea, and states active in
space exploration had in forming the law of outer space.13 While
both the sea and space are open to all states and can even
constitute a global common heritage, we need not examine state
practice of every state in the world to identify customary
international law governing them. This Essay does not address
whether specially interested states have an outsized role in
constituting customary international law; this Essay only makes
the more modest claim that specially interested state practice
proves the existence of customary international law. Therefore,
identifying customary international law requires considering
which states are more significantly engaged than others in certain
issues.
One important critique of this doctrine, however, is that
Western and/or Global North states may be disproportionately
considered specially interested.14 This concern might lead to abuse
10. See Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 36 (Anne Peters ed., 2006).
11. See ICRC, CUSTOMARY IHL, supra note 9, at xliv-xlv.
12. See, e.g., id. at xlix-l.
13. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 176 (Tanaka, J., dissenting); id.
at 227 (Lachs, J., dissenting).
14. See MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 51-2
(1979); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 354-55 (1989); GENNADY DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 96 (1993); Kevin Jon Heller, Specially-Affected States and the Formation of
Custom, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 191, 192 (2018).
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of the doctrine by those states to sway the law in their interest.15
Increasingly more states are publishing digests of what they view
their state practice to be and the UN General Assembly, European
Union and Council of Europe have encouraged the use of
standardized approaches for doing so.16 That said, simply
increasing the rate of self-reporting may not be sufficient.17 More
importantly, focusing on practice by Global North states is unlikely
to be truly representative. As a counterbalance to excessive
influence by a particular region or group of states, some authorities
have recognized that the specially interested states analysis must
also consider regional distribution.18 For example, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) study on
customary international humanitarian law consulted a variety of
states, not only states with recent experience of armed conflict,
ensuring that it examined states from all regions of the world,
acknowledging that all states had some interest in the rules on the
use of force and protection of humanity.19 For these reasons, this
Essay will apply a region-by-region approach to the specially
interested states analysis.
This Essay will not generally address whether non-state
actors can contribute to customary international law,20 other than
15. See DANILENKO, supra note 14, at 96.
16. See G.A. Res. 2099 (XX), at 89-90 (Dec. 20, 1965); Eur. Council, Council
Conclusions Inviting the Introduction of the European Case Law Identifier (ECLI) and a
Minimum Set of Uniform Metadata for Case Law, 2011 O.J. (C 127) 1, 2; Council of Eur.
Comm. Mins., Res. (68)17, Model Plan for the Classification of Documents Concerning
States Practice in the Field of Public International Law (June 28, 1968), as amended by
Recomm. 97(11) (June 12, 1997).
17. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995).
18. See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 227 (Lachs, J., dissenting); ICRC,
CUSTOMARY IHL, supra note 9, at xliv-xlv, li.
19. See ICRC, CUSTOMARY IHL, supra note 9, at xxx-xlv.
20. See Int’l L. Ass’n, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General
Customary International Law, Final Report of the Committee, Princs. 10, 11 cmt. (a), (b)
(2000). Also see Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 25 (May 28) (in identifying the
existence of customary international law, the Court examined the depositary practice of
the U.N. Secretary-General, a rare example of an international organization appearing to
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to observe that the European Union is widely understood to be an
important exception. The International Law Commission (“ILC”)
Special Rapporteur observed that the European Union may
contribute to customary international law when it acts as a state in
the scope of its competences.21 The European Union has also
submitted the same view,22 and several EU Member States have
agreed.23 Following the same reasoning, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) could also contribute to
customary international law when it operates within a state and
determines refugee status for that state.24 It is true that other nonstate actors are understood to contribute to customary
international law, for example, developing the law on noninternational armed conflict. But this conclusion is largely based on
the application of the law in such conflicts by and to such actors.
The only non-state actors involved in promulgating and applying
refugee law, respectively, are the European Union and UNHCR.
Therefore, only states would apply any customary international
refugee law, so the larger issues of non-state actors will be omitted
from this study, except for the European Union and UNHCR. Thus,
this analysis will include the practice of these two organizations.

contribute to customary international law); William Thomas Worster, The Contribution to
Customary International Law of Territories under International Administration, in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (Sufyan Droubi & Jean d’Aspremont, eds., 2021).
21. See ILC, Draft Conclusions on Customary International Law, supra note 2, at
conclusion 4(2), cmt. (6); Int’l L. Comm’n, Sir Michael Wood, Spec. Rapp., Third Report on
Identification of Customary International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/682 para. 45 (Mar. 27,
2015) [hereinafter ILC, Wood, Third Report].
22. See ILC, Wood, Third Report, at 53 n.184; Int’l L. Comm’n, Sir Michael Wood, Spec.
Rapp., Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/672 n.135 (May 22, 2014). See also General Assembly, Summary record of the 20th
meeting: 6th Committee, UN Doc. A/C.6/71/SR.20 para. 45 (Oct. 24, 2016).
23. See,
e.g.,
U.N.
GAOR
68th
Sess.,
6th
Comm.
21st mtg, para. 63, UN Doc. A/C.6/71/SR.21 (“Romania”) (Nov. 16, 2016); U.N. GAOR 69th
Sess.,
6th
Comm.
25th mtg, para. 130, UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.25 (Nov. 29, 2014) (delegate of Norway
speaking on behalf of Nordic countries, including EU).
24. See William Thomas Worster, The Evolving Definition of the Refugee in Customary
International Law, 30(1) BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 94 (2012) [hereinafter Worster, Evolving
Definition of the Refugee].
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III. CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ON REFUGEES AND
ASYLUM-SEEKERS
Contemporary international refugee law is primarily founded
on the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol,25 though
there are supplementary sources, including customary
international law.26 The Refugee Convention provides a definition
and terms on treatment of refugees. Beyond the adoption of the
1967 Protocol, the Refugee Convention has not been amended.
That said, a variety of regional instruments supplement the
Refugee Convention and expand its application to a wider pool of
potential refugees, such as the Organization of African Unity
Convention27 and European Union Qualification Directive.28 The
UNHCR has specifically argued that EU law is relevant to the
formation of customary international law on refugee status.29
25. See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150;
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (collectively,
Refugee Convention).
26. UN High Comm’r for Refugees, The Refugee Concept Under International Law:
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Mar. 8 2018),
https://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5aa290937/refugee-concept-underinternational-law.html [https://perma.cc/67RF-8YF7] [hereinafter UNHCR, Refugee
Concept] (“International refugee law derives from a range of treaties (universal and
regional), rules of customary international law, general principles of law, and national laws
and standards.”). See generally, Worster, Evolving Definition of the Refugee, supra note 24.
27. See Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 UNTS 45 [hereinafter OAU Refugee
Convention] (expanded the definition of refugee in the Refugee Convention to include
those fleeing “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously
disturbing public order.”).
28. See E.U. Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status
of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons who Otherwise
Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted (Apr. 29, 2004),
Council Directive, 2004/83/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 304/12) (EC) [hereinafter EU Qualification
Directive] (also expanding the scope of protection beyond those qualifying under the
Refugee Convention).
29. See UNHCR, Refugee Concept, supra note 26 (internal citations omitted):
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol laid the foundation upon which subsequent regional instruments
have built, including the 1969 OAU Convention, the 1984 Cartagena
Declaration, the EU Qualification Directive and other relevant instruments
of the EU asylum acquis communautaire, and the 1966 Bangkok Principles.
Collectively, this body of law, complemented by international human rights
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Added to these instruments, the international community has also
adopted various other non-binding instruments. Examples include
the Bangkok Principles,30 Cartagena Declaration,31 Brasilia
Declaration,32 and the Mercosur Rio de Janeiro Declaration.33
While these declarations do not themselves create binding
obligations, states adopted them in the context of international
organizations, and they inform us of states' views on the expected
protections. In some cases, states have adopted these non-binding
obligations within their domestic law.
The Refugee Convention and the regional instruments and
declarations differ slightly on the degree and scope of their
coverage and protection. This Essay primarily focuses on the
definition of individuals fleeing danger that states and
organizations designate as refugees, but other differences are
worthy of academic attention. While the Refugee Convention only
covers situations of persecution,34 the OAU Convention covers
individuals fleeing "external aggression, occupation, foreign

law, makes up the international refugee protection regime under which
UNHCR exercises its mandate responsibilities.
30. See Asian-Afr. Legal Consult. Org., [Bangkok] Principles Concerning Treatment of
Refugees, 8th Sess., at 38-45 (Aug. 17, 1966), https://www.aalco.int/report8thAS
[https://perma.cc/94Z3-2BTC] [hereinafter Bangkok Principles] (expanding the
definition of refugee to include “every person, who, owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part
or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or
nationality.”).
31. See Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International
Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, in Cartagena, Colombia,
19-22
Nov.
1984,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36ec.html
[https://perma.cc/AS3V-55G9] [hereinafter Cartagena Declaration] (expanding the
definition along the lines of the OAU Convention).
32. See Brasilia Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons in the
Americas, UNHCR, Brasilia Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons
in the Americas, Brasilia, (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/4cdd3fac6.html
[https://perma.cc/TH4W-54MD].
33. See MERCOSUR, Rio de Janeiro Declaration on the Institution of Refuge, Nov. 10,
2000, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3de4f8982.html [https://perma.cc/YEP783AX] [hereinafter Rio de Janeiro Declaration] (expanding the definition of refugee to
cover “individuals persecuted for reasons of race, nationality, religion, membership of a
particular social group, political opinion or victims of serious and generalized violation of
human rights”).
34. See Refugee Convention, supra note 25.
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domination or events seriously disturbing public order”35 and the
EU Qualification Directive provides for “subsidiary protection” for
individuals not qualifying as refugees but are otherwise at risk for
suffering serious harm.36 The non-binding declarations partly
repeat binding obligations of the OAU Convention or EU
Qualification Directive. For example, the Bangkok Principles and
Cartagena Declaration define protected persons similarly to the
OAU Convention.37 The Mercosur Rio de Janeiro Declaration
adopts a definition closer to the Refugee Convention, though it
builds on and refines some categories of persecuted persons.38
Of course, none of these regional instruments or declarations
have universal adherence, so we can also consider whether any of
their terms contribute to customary international law. Although
some scholars have been dubious of enough consistency to
establish customary international law governing refugee status for
differing groups of asylum-seekers,39 others argue that there is
enough widespread and consistent practice to identify some
rules.40 If we view the binding regional instruments collectively
and identify underlying state practice and opinio juris, we can find
some similarities in discrete elements within the refugee
definition. In addition, implementation of these binding and nonbinding obligations aligns in important ways in a widespread and
consistent manner. To this state practice and opinio juris we can
add that of the European Union and UNHCR to solidify those
obligations under customary international law. On this basis, an
expanded core refugee definition already exists under
international custom that includes, inter alia, persons fleeing
armed conflict.
This practice and opinio juris, however, relies heavily on
certain specially interested states,41 whose identities may be
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at 2.
See EU Qualification Directive, supra note 28.
See Bangkok Principles, supra note 30; Cartagena Declaration, supra note 31.
See Rio de Janeiro Declaration, supra note 33.
See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (1996); RICHARD
PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 393 (rev. 2d ed. 1988).
40. See Worster, Evolving Definition of the Refugee supra note 24, at 116.
41. See id.
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changing. When it comes to the law applying to asylum seekers, we
could consider which states are specially interested. Though all
states are interested in refugee migration in principle, refugees do
not disperse evenly around the world, and some states have a
significantly disproportionate burden in hosting individuals
claiming refugee status. The practice of states hosting significant
numbers of asylum-seekers gives those states an equally
disproportionate role in contributing to customary international
law, because their practice toward refugees impacts the greatest
number of persons seeking refuge. The total number of refugees
hosted in various states, and the number as a percentage of the
world population of asylum-seekers, as relevant to determine
which states were more or less specially interested, has already
been identified elsewhere.42 That practice and opinio juris was then
more influential in defining the scope and contours of the refugee
definition under customary international law.
We can determine which states are more or less specially
interested by assessing the number of persons protected in their
territory. The UNHCR database provides statistics on refugees and
individuals seeking asylum.43 This Essay includes both groups
because the latter might still qualify as refugees under the law,
though their status has not yet been recognized. Stateless persons
and internally displaced people are, however, excluded, so this
study focuses only on refugees. Of course, the numbers of persons
contain some degree of inherent ambiguity due to challenges of
identification and classification, as well as reliability issues. The
objective of this analysis is not to identify with a high degree of
precision the exact amounts of refugees and asylum-seekers
within in each state, but to generate a general overview of trends
in this forced migration. For this reason, readers may disagree
whether a state hosts 0.5 percent or 0.6 percent of the world total,

42. See generally William Thomas Worster, The Contemporary International Law
Status of the Right to Receive Asylum, 26 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 477 (2014); Worster, Evolving
Definition of the Refugee, supra note 24, at 117.
43. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Refugee Population Statistics Database,
https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/3LJ8-PD86] (last updated
June 18, 2021) [hereinafter UNHCR, Refugee Population Statistics Database]. See also, U.N.
High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2020 (2021),
https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/ [https://perma.cc/EY8T-HLVF].
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but can generally agree on which states, relatively speaking, are
experiencing increased migration.
IV. CHANGING PATTERNS OF ASYLUM-SEEKING MIGRATION44
Primarily due to armed conflict, the states that host larger
populations of persons seeking refuge are changing, with the
potential for a change in customary international law designating
persons fleeing armed conflict as refugees. Looking back ten years,
the following states used to host the largest number of asylumseekers. Syria has historically hosted the largest number of
refugees at 1.5 million, representing 15.5 percent of the world
total. Following Syria, Iran and Pakistan hosted almost one million
each, amounting to approximately ten percent of the world total
each. Germany, Jordan, and Tanzania each hosted approximately
half a million, or five percent of the world total. Following those
states at approximately three percent of the world total each were
China, the United Kingdom, Chad, the United States, and Kenya. Just
slightly lower were Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Sudan, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and Canada. At less than two percent of the
world total each were India, France, Nepal, Thailand, Yemen, and
Zambia. And at one percent of the world total each were Serbia,
Egypt, Algeria, the Netherlands, and Ethiopia. Sweden, Cameroon,
Rwanda, and Lebanon followed up closely behind. Perhaps it is also
interesting to note that, if the European Union were a state, it
would rank at number two on this list with more than 1.2 million
asylum-seekers. Of course, the United Kingdom was a member
state of the European Union at the time.
According to the approach previously stated, these statistics
lead to some conclusions about which states were more influential
in the past. The Bangkok Principles have historically been a strong
statement of opinio juris because some of the states with the largest
hosted populations—including Syria and Pakistan—authored the
declaration and other states with large populations of protected
44. The outlined in analysis in Part IV is based on the manipulation of publicly
available data from UNHCR’s Refugee Population Statistics Database. For further details
on this database and methods of analysis see UNHCR, Refugee Population Statistics
Database, supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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person, such as Iran, have subsequently participated by joining the
Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization. The Bangkok
Principles, however, are clearly non-binding, and not all states
have revised domestic state practice by, for example, adopting the
expanded refugee definition into domestic law. On the other hand,
the EU regulations that provide an expanded refugee definition are
binding, directly applicable, and strongly influence customary
international law. They do not, of course, constitute customary
international law alone, but do contribute to the global consensus
on customary international law. This influence is partly due to the
European Union’s role as a public law actor, and partly due to the
fact that it applies to the major hosting states of Germany, United
Kingdom, France, and Netherlands, among others. In addition, the
OAU Convention, which is similarly binding, is a strong expression
of practice and opinio juris, including the very important hosting
states of Tanzania, Chad, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, Cameroon,
and Rwanda. In sum, ten years ago, there was a very strong
practice of expanding the refugee definition in the Refugee
Convention to include people fleeing armed conflicts.
This list of recipients of asylum-seekers, however, is changing
in light of the recent massive refugee crisis, especially due to the
armed conflict in Syria (previously the largest host of refugees),
Afghanistan, Myanmar, and other places. The state now hosting the
largest number of refugees is Turkey, which protects almost four
million refugees/asylum-seekers, sixteen percent of the world
total. Germany, Pakistan, Uganda, and the United States place far
behind Turkey at only 1.5 million each, or six percent of the world
total each. The next tier is Sudan, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Ethiopia,
Iran, and Jordan, with populations at just under one million each.
France, Peru, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and
Cameroon all had approximately 0.5 million, or two percent of the
world total each. Egypt and South Sudan have 1.5 percent each, and
China, Iraq, Sweden, Tanzania, Brazil, South Africa, Niger, the
United Kingdom, Spain, India, Canada, Italy, Malaysia, and Yemen
all host approximately one percent each. States with
approximately 0.5 percent of the world total each include Greece,
Austria, Rwanda, Australia, Ecuador, Mexico, Switzerland,
Armenia, Algeria, Costa Rica, Thailand, Mauritania, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Burundi. If the European Union counted as a de
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facto unified regime, it would still be the second-most important
actor contributing to customary international law. It currently
hosts 3.6 million asylum seekers, amounting to fourteen percent of
the world total, and almost as many as Turkey alone. Following
Brexit, the United Kingdom’s numbers are naturally removed from
the European Union; however, the Union would still host 3.4
million asylum-seekers, thus remaining at the same ranking on this
list.
These changes mean that several states now qualify as
specially interested, and thus more influential in shaping
customary international law. Turkey has clearly jumped to the top
of the list, experiencing a 57,038 percent increase in asylum
seekers, and is now the top destination for asylum-seekers
worldwide. Not but ten years ago, Turkey’s influence on customary
international law in this area was considerably less influential.
Peru is also becoming far more important. A 54,360 percent
increase in refugees has pushed the state to into the top fifteen.
South Sudan has seen a significant increase as well. The precise
numbers for South Sudan from ten years ago were not reported
with a high degree of confidence, so it is more difficult to evaluate
their growth. But having jumped from a small, albeit uncertain,
number of asylum-seekers to a top twenty host state, it certainly
has experienced a significant change in its role. Bangladesh is
another arrival on the most influential list. It has experienced a
3,042 percent increase in refugees, largely due to the Rohingya
crisis in Myanmar. Now Bangladesh is comfortably within the top
ten hosts of refugees in the world. Lebanon and Ethiopia are
growing, experiencing a 1,652 percent and 841 percent increase in
asylum-seekers respectively. Brazil, Niger, Spain, Greece, and
Ecuador are also increasingly important. For example, although
Brazil is only in the top twenty-six states in the overall number of
forced migrants under its care, it has seen an increase in asylumseekers of 6,831 percent over the past ten years.
Some states are quite resilient in maintaining a consistently
high degree of significance. The European Union, Pakistan,
Germany, Iran, and Jordan continue to be about as highly relevant
as before. As noted above, the European Union continues, over the
past ten years, at the second highest number of asylum-seekers.
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Although it has experienced an almost two hundred percent
increase in people seeking asylum, that growth generally keeps
pace with the global increase. Notably, within the European Union,
a significant amount of this growth has been shouldered by
Germany, which increased its refugee population by 274 percent
and is now the third most important host state worldwide. The
second tier of states that maintain a stable impact on customary
international law includes Chad, the United States, Kenya, Uganda,
Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and France.
Other states are losing influence. Nepal, Thailand, Zambia,
Serbia, and Congo no longer significantly contribute to customary
international law. Saudi Arabia also eliminated its reception of
asylum-seekers by ninety-nine percent and fell in significance. The
greatest drop, however, is Syria, for obvious reasons. Once the
most critical host state, protecting more than fifteen percent of all
the refugees worldwide, it has lost more than ninety-eight percent
of its refugees and now hosts only a negligible global percentage.
In fact, Syria has shifted from being a host state to being a major
producer of refugee flight.
The armed conflicts and changes in refugee migration suggest
changes in influence. Currently, no customary international law
study of refugee law, status, or treatment can be complete without
consulting the practice and opinio juris of Turkey, Pakistan,
Uganda, the United States, Sudan, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Ethiopia,
Iran, and Jordan. Germany and France are important states as well,
as their practices, along with that of the European Union,
significantly influence the content of customary international law.
Peru, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Cameroon,
and Egypt are also important. To ensure geographical
representation and counterbalance the risk of disproportionate
regional role in forming customary international law, China, Brazil,
India, Canada, Malaysia, Australia, and Armenia should also have a
seat at the table.
V. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGING SPECIALLY
INTERESTED STATES
This Part addresses specific state policies and their changing
influence. This is not an exhaustive analysis of all customary
international norms of refugee law. Instead, this Part will focus
only on the expanded refugee definition.
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Syria was, in some ways, a good influence on the refugee
definition prior to the armed conflict. It permitted the UNHCR to
operate in country and had begun to reform its asylum
procedures.45 While it was not a party to the Refugee Convention,
it exercised a strong and relatively generous protection policy by
hosting very large amounts of persons fleeing the armed conflict in
Iraq.46 Also, participating in the Bangkok Principles affirmed that
not only people fleeing armed conflict were properly classified as
refugees, but also individuals fleeing “external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality.” 47
Turkey, on the other hand, implements a more restrictive
definition. Most importantly, it maintains strict limitations on its
accession to the Refugee Convention by not recognizing nonEuropeans as refugees.48 That being said, Turkey did advocate for
expanding the refugee definition to include persons fleeing
international or internal armed conflict. Still, it did not advocate for
the more extensive definition in the declaration covering
aggression, occupation, and public disturbance, as mentioned
above. In addition, the Law on Foreigners and International
Protection does not contemplate permanent settlement for
45. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Syria, https://www.unhcr.org/sy/refugees
[https://perma.cc/J9BT-W6HE] (“Syria has been tolerant in hosting refugees and has
continued to cooperate with UNHCR in extending protection and assistance to refugees
and asylum seekers on its territory”); United States Committee for Refugees and
Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2009 – Syria, (June 17, 2009),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a40d2b3a.html [https://perma.cc/P8CG-SND3]
[hereinafter USCRI, World Refugee Survey 2009 – Syria] (“In October 2006, the [Syrian]
Government formed the National Asylum Law Committee to draft an asylum law, and
Committee members have traveled to UNHCR headquarters to discuss this process. During
2008, the Swiss government offered to work with UNHCR and Syria to craft a refugee
policy.”).
46. See USCRI, World Refugee Survey 2009 – Syria, supra note 45.
47. See Bangkok Principles, supra note 30, art. I(2)–(3).
48. Refugee Convention, supra note 25. See also U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES,
STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967
PROTOCOL (Apr. 2015), https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GD9N-RVVM] [hereinafter STATES PARTIES TO THE REFUGEE CONVENTION].
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refugees.49 While the Turkish authorities have adopted a more
flexible approach for the case of Syrian refugees and does permit
UNHCR to operate in-country,50 they are excluded from
recognition as de jure refugees.51 The outsize role of Turkey in
hosting asylum-seekers makes this practice increasingly
significant in assessing customary international law.
In addition, other major host states have mixed practices, with
perhaps a slightly more restrictive approach than in the past.
Pakistan, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Jordan, India, and Malaysia are not
parties to the Refugee Convention52 or any binding instrument.
Pakistan, Jordan, and India do participate in the Bangkok
Principles.53 Pakistan and Jordan did not oppose a more expensive
definition, though India did.54 Iran and China are indeed party to
both the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol,55 and they
49. See generally Yabancilar ve Uluslararasi Koruma Kanunu [Law on Foreigners and
International Protection], Apr. 4, 2013, Resmî Gazete [Official Gazette], No. 28615 (Apr. 11,
2013),
https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2017/04/LoFIP_ENG_DGMM_revised-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XEM6-Y3Q5]; Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP),
Law No. 6458, art. 1(1), (Apr. 4, 2013), https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2017/02/law_on_foreigners_and_international_protection.pd
f [https://perma.cc/6E7W-HQNS].
50. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Praises
the Republic of Turkey for its Continued Commitment to Provide Protection to All Those in
Need (Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/30521-un-high-commissioner-forrefugees-praises-the-republic-of-turkey-for-its-continued-commitment-to-provideprotection-to-all-those-in-need.html [https://perma.cc/8P53-M6RA].
51. See Oktay Durukan et al., Asylum Information Database, Country Report: Turkey
11–15
(May
18,
2015),
https://asylumineurope.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/report-download_aida_turkey_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8G2U-62WR] (“Turkey maintains a geographical limitation to the 1951
Refugee Convention, restricting its application to refugees originating from European
countries”); Thomas Huddleston et al., Migration Integration Policy Index 2015 208–11
(2015), https://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/files/mipex-2015-booka5.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX7V-MQTF]; Turkey Ranks Bottom in Migrant Integration
Report with Flow of Refugees, HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS (June 23, 2015),
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-ranks-bottom-in-migrant-integrationreport-with-flow-of-refugees.aspx?pageID=238&nID=84424&NewsCatID=339
[https://perma.cc/YX9V-YSMK].
52. Refugee Convention, supra note 25; STATES PARTIES TO THE REFUGEE CONVENTION,
supra note 48.
53. See Bangkok Principles, supra note 30.
54. See id.
55. Refugee Convention, supra note 25; STATES PARTIES TO THE REFUGEE CONVENTION,
supra note 48.
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also participate in the Bangkok Principles as a supplementary
instrument and are supportive of the expansive definition.56 China
permits the UNHCR to operate but prohibits it from working near
the North Korean border.57 Similarly, Peru and Brazil are parties to
the Refugee Convention, but not to the non-binding Cartagena
Declaration.58 That said, Brazil has adopted terms of the Cartagena
Declaration into its domestic law.59
However, there are some more potentially positive influences
on customary international law. The European Union is generally
a good influence on refugee practice because EU law is rather
liberal and the EU Member States are parties to the Refugee
Convention,60 and implement their obligations therein. EU refugee
regulations are also directly applicable in the Member States.61
Germany and France, as such major states of protection, have
particularly strong influence. The EU definition in the Qualification
Directive, however, differs from the OAU Refugee Convention or
Bangkok Principles. It merely repeats the refugee definition from
the Refugee Convention and adds a “subsidiary protection” option
for individuals who do not qualify as refugees but are at risk of
serious harm.62 As of the time of this writing, four million
individuals have fled from the conflict in Ukraine to the European
Union and are being admitted under the EU Temporary Protection
Directive which does not purport to apply any definition of

56. See Bangkok Principles, supra note 30.
57. See United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey
2009 – China, (June 17, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a40d2a3c.html
[https://perma.cc/D8LR-LKTE].
58. See Cartagena Declaration, supra note 31, at concl. III, 5.
59. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, ACNUR parabeniza Brasil por reconhecer
condição de refugiado de venezuelanos com base na Declaração de Cartagena (July 29,
2019),
https://www.acnur.org/portugues/2019/07/29/acnur-parabeniza-brasil-porreconhecer-condicao-de-refugiado-de-venezuelanos-com-base-na-declaracao-decartagena/ [https://perma.cc/J6JB-49UX].
60. Refugee Convention, supra note 25; STATES PARTIES TO THE REFUGEE CONVENTION,
supra note 48.
61. See EU Qualification Directive, supra note 28.
62. See id. art. 2(f).
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refugee.63 It merely manages mass influx. In time, these individuals
admitted to the EU may apply for more robust protection under the
Qualification Directive. At that point, they will test how expansive
the Qualification Directive is. If these millions of individuals are
confirmed for subsidiary protection rather than refugee status,
then this act will constitute strong evidence that fleeing armed
conflict is not part of a customary refugee definition.
That said, other specially interested states may also exert
influence favoring an expansive definition. Canada, Australia, and
Armenia are party to the Refugee Convention, though the United
States is not.64 Instead, it is party to the 1967 Protocol.65 Uganda,
Sudan, Kenya, Cameroon, and Egypt also positively influence a
much more expansive refugee definition. They are parties to the
Refugee Convention and Protocol,66 OAU Convention,67 and
Bangkok Principles,68 and permit UNHCR to operate in country and
apply its policies. For example, Kenya hosts huge refugee camps,
which shows a willingness to apply a liberal definition of qualifying
persons in line with those instruments. Ethiopia, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and Chad are parties to both the Refugee
Convention69 and the OAU Convention.70 The OAU Convention
adopts, in binding law, the expended refugee definition covering
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or public
order disturbances mentioned in the Bangkok Principles.
In reaching general observations, we may be seeing the
beginning of a shift to a more restrictive approach in customary
international law. Turkey’s influence is critical in this shift, but
Pakistan, Lebanon, Bangladesh, and Jordan are also important.
Increasingly, states that are not party to the Refugee Convention
and not supportive of expanded definitions are hosting asylumseekers. The European Union (especially Germany), Uganda,
63. See Council Directive 2001/55/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 212/12) (EC) [hereinafter EU
Temporary Protection Directive].
64. See Refugee Convention, supra note 25; STATES PARTIES TO THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION, supra note 48, at 1.
65. See 1967 Refugee Protocol, supra note 25.
66. See Refugee Convention, supra note 25; STATES PARTIES TO THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION, supra note 48, at 2-4.
67. See OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at 14.
68. See Bangkok Principles, supra note 30.
69. See Refugee Convention, supra note 25; STATES PARTIES TO THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION, supra note 48, at 2.
70. See OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 27, at 14.
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Sudan, and Ethiopia counterbalance some of this restrictive
approach for the time being. This shift could suggest, for example,
a slight diminishment of state practice that supports the expanded
definition of refugees as including persons fleeing war.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Essay suggests a general methodology for assessing
customary international law and identifies some preliminary
indications of where customary international law on a refugee
definition may be heading. Customary international law is formed
by state practice and opinio juris, so state actions can directly
impact international law. Certain states, so-called “specially
interested” states, are critical in this analysis, but the states that
are specially interested in refugee protection are changing.
Some of these changes enhance the role of states with positive
protection regimes, but applying this methodology may suggest
the diminishment of influence of states with expansive refugee
protection policies. A broad survey of practice shows that the
definition of refugee as including persons fleeing armed conflict,
not only persons fleeing persecution or torture, may be weakening.
A rule that evolves to become more conservative will protect fewer
people from armed conflict.
Of course, states with generous refugee regimes, who
interpret their international obligations liberally could positively
impact customary international law by increasing admissions of
persons fleeing armed conflict to have more parity with states in
the current main refugee regions to enhance their status as
specially interested states. In the Ukraine conflict, initial reports
indicate that the European Union may take this approach, though
the individuals fleeing at this early point are only covered by a
Temporary Protection regime, and their refugee status is not yet
determined.71 Such enhanced influence in forming customary
international law would result in a stronger, more liberal refugee
protection regime worldwide. If states in the region were obligated
to provide stronger protection, then ultimately, more people
71. See EU Temporary Protection Directive, supra note 63.
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would be protected in the region. Paradoxically, increasing
admissions of asylum-seekers might make it easier for destination
states to argue against further asylum-seeker admissions.

